











This	 paper	 traces	 the	meanings	 and	 impacts	 of	 the	 increased	 and	 transformed	visibility	 of	
Muslim	communities	in	Canada,	as	evidenced	through	their	experiences	of	surveillance	and	
violence.	It	explores	the	contours	of	this	visibility	as	well	as	the	consequences.	Relationships	
between	 Muslims	 and	 non‐Muslims	 are	 shaped	 in	 and	 through	 hostility,	 harassment	 and	
violence	 which	 is	 directed	 toward	 increasingly	 visible	 Muslim	 communities.	 Guiding	 the	














security	 forces	 and	 the	 broader	 public.	 Prior	 to	 9/11,	 Canadian	 Muslims	 remained	 largely	
unremarked.	They	were	not	recognized	as	a	noteworthy	presence	in	quantitative	or	qualitative	
terms.	 Indeed,	 as	 Cainkar	 (2002:	 22)	 observes,	 they	 have	 often	 been	 elided	 with	 Arabs	
generally,	 and	 thus	 ‘hidden	 under	 the	 Caucasian	 label,	 if	 not	 forgotten	 altogether’.	 The	 tragic	















relationships	 between	 Muslims	 and	 non‐Muslims	 are	 shaped	 in	 and	 through	 hostility,	
harassment	and	violence	directed	toward	increasingly	visible	Muslim	communities.	Guiding	the	
analysis	 of	 the	 connections	 between	 visibility	 and	 hate	 crime	 is	 a	 framework	 developed	 by	
Brighenti	 (2007)	 that	 posits	 three	 distinct	 yet	 inter‐connected	 forms	 of	 visibility.	 Each	 has	
consequences	 for	 shaping	Muslim	 vulnerability	 to	 hate	 crime	 in	 either	 enabling	 or	 disabling	
ways.	
	
The	paper	 draws	on	 findings	 from	a	 series	 of	 interviews	and	 focus	 groups	with	Muslim	men,	
women	and	 youth	 in	Ottawa	and	Toronto,	 Canada.	 In	 each	 city,	we	 conducted	 eight	 in‐depth,	




what	meanings	 these	 events	have	 for	 the	people	 involved	 and	 for	 their	 communities.	That	 is,	
how	fearful	of	bias‐motivated	victimization	are	Canadian	Muslims?	What	impact	does	it	have	on	




The	 participants	 ranged	 in	 age	 from	 16	 to	 76	 years	 of	 age;	 40	 were	 female,	 32	 were	 male.	
Culturally,	they	were	a	diverse	lot,	ranging	from	native	born	Canadians	to	people	who	had	lived	
in	 the	 country	 for	 only	 a	 few	 years	 or	 even	 a	 few	 months.	 Multiple	 nations	 of	 origin	 were	
represented,	including	India,	Pakistan,	Somalia,	Turkey,	Albania,	the	UK	and	France.	Some	were	








by	 2031,	 Muslims	 could	 very	 well	 represent	 over	 6	 per	 cent	 (2.5	 million)	 of	 Canadians	
(Malenfant	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Approximately	 85	 per	 cent	 of	 Canadian	 Muslims	 live	 in	 major	
metropolitan	 areas,	 with	 nearly	 400,000	 in	 the	 Greater	 Toronto	 region,	 over	 150,000	 in	
Montreal,	and	nearly	60,000	in	Ottawa	(Malenfant	et	al.	2010).	Roughly	one	third	of	Canadian	
Muslims	 are	 of	 South	 Asian	 background;	 a	 third	 of	 Arab	 background;	 and	 a	 third	 of	 other	
backgrounds,	 including	African	 and	European.	 For	 some	Canadians,	 the	growth	and	diversity,	



























it	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	 struggle	 to	 set	 the	 terms	 of	 discourse	 and	 action,	 and	 to	 impose	 a	
particular	type	of	order.			
	
However,	 each	 form	 of	 power	 contains	 its	 own	 corresponding	 forms	 of	 resistance.	 Those	
relations	 of	 inequality	 must	 consistently	 be	 reproduced	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 struggle	 and	






Like	power,	visibility	 is	neither	 inherently	empowering	nor	disempowering.	On	 the	one	hand,	
both	sides	of	the	equation	may	empower	subjects.	To	be	invisible	is	to	fly	under	the	radar,	so	to	
speak,	 in	 ways	 that	 allow	 groups	 to	 exist	 unremarked	 and	 thus	 secure.	 Yet	 visibility	 –	 as	
recognition	–	allows	groups	to	engage	with	the	broader	public.	On	the	other	hand,	the	‘economy	
of	visibility’	can	also	herald	negative	effects.	Invisibility	can	render	its	subjects	impotent,	where	
it	 implies	 marginalization.	 Visibility	 at	 once	 parallels	 and	 permits	 the	 ‘normalizing	 gaze’	 by	
which	a	particular	ordering	is	created.	It	‘can	be	used	to	divide	marked	and	unmarked	persons’	
(Brighenti	 2007:	 334).	 It	 allows	 both	 self	 and	 other	 to	 be	 seen,	 but	 especially	 to	 be	 seen	 in	
relation	to	one	another.	What	is	most	significant	about	this	positioning	of	self	and	other	is	the	
fact	that	it	implies	the	normativity	of	a	hegemonic	form,	what	Lorde	(1995:	192)	refers	to	as	a	















Yet	 recall	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 functioning	 of	 visibility	 is	 not	 fixed;	 it	 is	 protean	 and	 adaptive.	
Highlighting	 this	 diversity,	 Brighenti	 identifies	 three	 ideal	 types	 of	 visibility,	 which	 provide	
useful	 heuristic	 devices	 for	 the	 analysis	 that	 follows	 here.	 There	 is	what	 she	 refers	 to	 as	 the	
‘media‐type’	which	forcefully	renders	subjects	‘supra‐visible’	in	ways	that	distort	their	identities	
(Brighenti	2007:	330).	Through	myriad	discursive	processes,	 communities	 are	brought	 to	 the	









Once	marked	 in	 this	 way,	 communities	 become	 subject	 to	 the	 ‘control‐type’	 of	 visibility	 as	 a	
resource	for	 ‘regulation	or	selectivity	and	stratification,	or	both’	(Brighenti	2007:	339).	In	this	
case,	 visibility	 becomes	 the	 basis	 for	 dividing	 practices	 as	 well	 as	 for	 controlling	 forms	 of	
violence.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 popular	 representations	 of	 communities	 are	 shored	 up	 by	
parallel	 practices	 that	 draw	 further	 attention	 to	Muslims.	 State	 security	 actions,	 for	 example,	
both	 draw	 on	 and	 reinforce	 popular	 images,	 institutionalizing	 them	 within	 classification	
schema.	 This	 enables	 and	 legitimates	 subsequent	 subjugation	 and	 control	 with	 respect	 to	
stigmatized	groups.	On	the	other	hand,	once	classified	by	the	state,	such	groups	are	‘revealed’	as	
threatening,	 thereby	 (re)shaping	 popular	 reactions,	 both	 attitudinal	 and	 behavioural.	 Indeed,	
Muslims	 are	 the	 focus	 of	 heightened	 visibility	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 containment	 via	 both	 state	
surveillance	and	street	level	hate	crime.	
	
Finally,	 visibility	 is	 also	 a	 potentially	 empowering	 resource:	 social‐type,	 as	 Brighenti	 (2007:	
339)	refers	to	 it.	 In	this	model,	visibility	 is	akin	to	recognition.	 It	revolves	around	groups’	and	






As	noted	above,	 the	Other	must	be	made	visible	before	 they	can	be	 justifiably	set	outside	 the	




specifically	may	represent	the	 last	 ‘legitimate’	subjects	of	slanderous	 imagery	and	stereotypes	
(Said	 1997;	 Suleiman1999).	 Political	 leaders,	 unfortunately,	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 this,	 as	
Muslims	can	attest:	‘I	think	it’s	just	politicians	using	terrorism	as	a	tool	…	It’s	really	putting	it	out	
there	and	making	it	become	a	really	important	part	of	people’s	consciousness’	(Female).	We	are	
by	 now	 all	 familiar	 with	 George	W	 Bush’s	 frequent	 references	 to	 ‘evil	 doers’	 –	 by	 which	 he	






[sic]	 and	 peaceful	 nations,	 is	 making	 a	 statement	 like	 that,	 it	 just	 applies	 the	




within	 which	 popular	 imagery	 and	 hostility	 emerge.	 	 Political	 discourse	 reaffirms	 and	











survey	 of	 some	 300	 Canadian	 Muslims,	 the	 Canadian	 Council	 on	 American‐Islamic	 Relations	
(CAIR‐CAN)	 (2004)	 found	 that	 55	 per	 cent	 of	 respondents	 thought	 the	 Canadian	media	were	
more	 biased	 since	 9/11.	 A	 survey	 of	 nine	 Canadian	 newspapers	 by	 the	 Canadian	 Islamic	
Congress	 (2005)	 noted	 an	 increase	 in	 anti‐Muslim	 stereotypes	 after	 September	 2001.	 More	









normal,	 that	they	can’t	 fit	 in	the	West	for	some	inherent	division	between	them	
and	 the	 Western	 world,	 that	 they	 are	 inherently	 violent	 against	 women.	 That	
plays	a	lot	of	factors	into	the	idea	that	they	are	sort	of	barbaric,	just	this	idea	that	




latter	 is	 to	be	 feared,	 ridiculed	 and	 loathed	 for	 their	 differences	 as	 recognized	 in	 the	popular	
psyche.	 Significantly,	 these	 legitimating	 ideologies	 and	 images	 mark	 the	 Other,	 and	 the	
boundaries	 between	 self	 and	 other.	 	 A	 young	 Muslim	man	 points	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 this	
process	of	othering	is	evident:	‘one	of	the	talk	shows	at	least	once	a	week	picks	on	some	incident	






Few	 activities	 so	 dramatically	 promote	 Muslims’	 visibility	 as	 the	 post‐9/11	 surveillance	
practices	of	Western	states.	Such	practices	have	both	actively	enhanced	the	visibility	of	Muslims	
and	 situated	 them	 as	 ‘not	 like	 us’.	 	 Contemporary	 ‘security’	 measures	 call	 attention	 to	 the	
Muslim	presence	and	the	inherent	threat	posed	by	their	presumed	traits,	as	outlined	above.	In	
short,	 excessive	 surveillance	 reinforces	 the	 normality	 of	 whiteness/Christianity,	 while	
‘abnormalizing’	non‐white	Muslims.	Their	surveillance	as	potential	 terrorists	places	 them	 in	a	
position	of	marginalization	vis‐à‐vis	white	Canadians,	who	exercise	power	over	‘brown’	bodies	
thus	marking	them	as	Other	(Finn	2011:	424).	A	Muslim	woman	speaks	of	this	in	the	context	of	
airport	 checks,	 stating	 that,	 because	 of	 such	 practices,	 ‘I	 think	 we	 feel	 even	 further	 more	
ostracized’.	
	
One	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 demonization	 of	 Muslims	 on	 the	 part	 of	 politicians	 (noted	
above)	is	that	it	finds	its	way	into	policies	and	practices	that	further	stigmatize	the	group.	This	is	












Here,	Muslim	 identity	 is	 taken	 to	 signify	 terrorist	 identity,	 such	 that	Muslims	 are	marked	 as	
different	from	and	indeed	threatening	to	‘good’	Canadians.		
	





intrusive	 law	 enforcement	 activities	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 contraction	 of	 individual	 and	
collective	 rights	 on	 the	 other.	 A	 2005	 CAIR‐CAN	 report	 documents	 extensive	 experiences	 in	
which	 law	 enforcement	 agents	 (Canadian	 Security	 and	 Intelligence	 Service	 (CSIS),	 Royal	
Canadian	Mounted	Police	(RCMP),	police)	‘approached’	or	‘contacted’	Arabs	and	Muslims,	often	
with	no	explanation	for	the	contact.	Of	the	467	respondents,	8	per	cent	had	been	contacted	–	the	
bulk	 of	 whom	 (84	 per	 cent)	 were	 Canadian	 citizens.	 Among	 those	 who	 were	 not	 directly	
contacted,	 nearly	 half	 (43	 per	 cent)	 knew	 at	 least	 one	 other	 Canadian	Muslim	who	had	 been	




them	were	 subject	 to	 scrutiny	 in	 their	personal	 and	public	 lives.	 Such	 incidents	 took	place	 in	











The	 effect	 of	 these	 patterns	 is	 to	 draw	 a	 line	 between	 ‘law	 abiding’	 Canadians	 and	 ‘terrorist’	
Muslims.	It	reinforces	the	public	perception	that	Muslims	are	questionable	with	respect	to	their	
loyalty	 to	 Canada	 and	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 knowledge	 of,	 if	 not	 involvement	 in,	 terrorism.	

























my	study	stated	 that	 ‘the	media’s	 created	an	enemy	and	 they’re	 attacking	 the	enemy	because	
that’s	what	they’ve	been	told	to	do	by	the	media’	(Female).	 	Thus,	it	is	not	only	the	gaze	of	the	
state	that	constrains.	Public	scrutiny	and	reaction	also	seek	to	limit	the	inclusion	of	Muslims	into	







Added	 to	 this	 is	 the	 fact	 that	more	 than	 25	 per	 cent	 of	 racially	motivated	 hate	 crimes	were	
perpetrated	against	East/South	East	Asians,	 South	Asians	and	Arab/West	Asians,	 ethno‐racial	
groups	 typically	perceived	by	 the	 general	population	as	 likely	 to	be	Muslim	 (Allen	and	Boyce	
2013).	From	being	virtually	absent	before	2001,	hate	crimes	against	Muslims	rose	dramatically	
in	 the	months	 after	 September	2001	 (Helly	 2004,	 2011).	 In	Montréal,	 for	 example,	 the	police	
recorded	about	a	dozen	complaints	from	11	September	to	20	September	2001.	The	Council	on	
American	 Islamic	 Relations	 (Hussain	 2002)	 recorded	 approximately	 fifty	 incidents	 in	 Canada	





Muslims	 of	 ‘their	 place’	 in	 the	 cultural	 hierarchy.	 Interestingly,	 few	 of	 the	 participants	 had	
experienced	 serious	 violence,	 although	 most	 had	 been	 targets	 of	 verbal	 abuse.	 Moreover,	
virtually	everyone	had	multiple	stories	 to	share	about	 incidents	that	 they	had	witnessed	or	of	






I	 was	 walking	 through	 my	 neighbourhood	 with	 my	 Muslim	 friends	 when	
someone	 threw	 a	 bottle	 of	 urine	 at	 us	 from	 a	 car	 window	 and	 drove	 away,	
laughing	and	calling	us	terrorists.	(Female)	
	













For	 the	most	part,	 it’s	 just,	A	–	 they	 feel	 that	your	overtaking	 their	 land;	or	B	–	














in	 the	 streets	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 dress,	 their	 appearance	 and	 their	mosques.	 ‘All	 of	 a	 sudden’,	
suggests	 a	 Muslim	 male,	 ‘there	 are	 Muslims.	 There	 is	 backlash,	 a	 movement	 to	 control	 the	
“infiltration”	 of	 Muslims.	 There	 are	 anti‐Muslim/racist	 radio	 shows	 and	 TV	 shows’.	 Muslim	
bodies	are	now	increasingly	within	our	gaze.		
	
Muslims	 in	 Canada,	 since	 at	 least	 the	1990s,	 have	 expressed	 themselves	 bodily	 through	 their	
sartorial	representations	of	identity.	The	experiences	of	participants	in	my	study	make	it	clear	
that	 they	 understand	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 type	 of	 visibility	 for	 attempts	 to	 further	
marginalize	 them	 through	 violence.	 Visibility	 becomes	 the	 context	 and	 impetus	 for	 outward	









both	seen	and	heard.	The	posture	of	entitlement	 taken	by	Muslim	activists	 can	be	 seen	as	 an	




I	 think	 it	 is	 this	 the	 dichotomization	 of	 the	 Muslim	 community	 into	 the	 good	










And	 the	 tone,	 for	 what	 they	 write	 about	 me;	 the	 caricature	 they	 make	 of	 me,	






















all	 the	 anti‐Muslim	 sentiments	 and	 hate	 that	 was	 going	 around	 in	 my	 school.	
(Female)		
	
This	 is	 a	 powerful	 reminder	 that	 persistent	 surveillance	 and	 categorization	 can	 be	 directly	
challenged	 through	 equally	 persistent	 expressions	 of	 Muslim	 identities.	 Visibility	 becomes	 a	
show	 of	 strength	 that	 reflects	 the	 wielding	 of	 power	 by	 its	 very	 subjects.	 It	 reimagines	 ‘the	



















was	an	 important	corrective.	For	example,	 ‘just	by	simply	 talking	 to	a	stranger	and	being	 like	
“Hey.	I’m	not	scary.	I’m	a	friendly	person”.	It	creates	an	image	for	them	and	they	in	turn	will	tell,	
“Hey.	I	met	this,	like,	Muslim	girl	and	she’s	actually	pretty	cool”‘	(Female).	Others	spoke	of	their	
relationships	 with	 their	 non‐Muslim	 friends,	 and	 how	 they	 were	 able	 to	 break	 through	 the	
stereotypes	simply	by	being	themselves.		
	
For	 others,	 the	 crucial	 arenas	 for	 intervention	 were	 seen	 to	 be	 the	 very	 institutions	 noted	
earlier:	politics	and	media.	There	was	a	strong	recognition	of	the	need	to	directly	engage	with	




So	 I	 think	 the	 big	 political	 leaders,	 not	 only	 in	 Canada,	 but	 global	 scale,	 the	
international	 political	 leaders,	 need	 to	 think	 about	 their	 rhetoric	 because	
whatever	 they	 say	 is	 taken	 out	 by	 the	 media	 and	 that	 sort	 of	 creates	 and	







to	 offer	 alternative	 and	 constructive	 voices.	 Some,	 then,	 highlighted	 the	 potential	 of	
representing	themselves	through	Muslim‐based	media	venues.	This	is	an	increasingly	common	
practice	 among	 minority	 communities	 in	 Canada,	 where	 ethnic	 media	 provide	 counter	
discourses	(Lindgren	2013).		As	one	participant	in	my	study	put	it:	
	
There	should	be	a	strong	 journalism	 in	 the	Muslim	community	also.	The	youth,	
especially	 the	 kids.	 There	 should	 be	 some	 system	 from	mosques,	 from	 Islamic	
centres,	even	from	the	government,	where	there	should	be	a	special	 funding	on	
people	 who	 have	 good	 writing	 skills.	 Yes,	 they	 should	 write.	 You	 know	 that	





to	 overcome	 the	 sentiment	 noted	 earlier	wherein	 the	more	Muslim	 one	 is,	 the	 less	 Canadian	
they	 are	 held	 to	 be.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 demands	 that	 Muslims	 develop	within	 their	 own	
communities	the	sense	of	belonging,	of	sharing	both	Muslim	and	Canadian	identities:	
	
We	 should	 realize	 that	 as	Muslims,	we	 can	 live	 here	 and	 become	 Canadians	 as	










when	 our	 young	 sisters	 in	 hijab	 are	 being	 flirted,	 flirted	with	 by	 non‐Muslims!	
Non‐Muslim	young	men	are	flirting	with	hijabi	women.	And	you	say,	 ‘Well	what	
kind	 of	 a	 statement	 is	 that?’!	 I’m	 saying	 it	 because,	 the	 hijab	 has,	 is	 becoming	










The	 post‐9/11	 context	 across	 the	West	 unquestioningly	 presents	 challenges	 for	 increasingly	
visible	Muslim	 communities.	 Yet	 the	 narratives	 shared	 here	 are	 an	 important	 reminder	 that	
those	challenges	also	present	opportunities.	This	paper	has	highlighted	the	ways	in	which	the	
transformed	 and	 transformative	 visibility	 of	 Muslim	 communities	 in	 Canada	 has	 been	
simultaneously	disempowering	and	empowering.	The	ambiguity	of	visibility	is	what	makes	it	a	
valuable	 resource	 for	 affirming	 Muslim	 identities	 and	 agency.	 By	 turning	 their	 faces	 toward	
rather	 than	 away	 from	 ‘the	 gaze’,	 Muslims	 ‘symbolize	 their	 demands	 for	 social	 justice	 by	






Framing	 Muslims’	 stories	 within	 Brighenti’s	 (2007)	 understanding	 of	 visibilities,	 I	 have	
highlighted	the	impact	of	being	constantly	seen	in	terms	of	discursive	representations,	state	and	
popular	 surveillance	 and	 harassment,	 and	 finally,	 Muslim	 activism.	 Political	 and	 media	
distortions	 render	 largely	 one	 dimensional	 images	 of	Muslims	 that	 separate	 them	out	 as	 ‘not	
Canadian’	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 putative	 values	 and	 ‘inherent’	 connection	 to	 terrorism.	 These	







fact,	 celebrate	 their	 visibility	 as	 a	 means	 by	 which	 to	 affirm	 their	 normalcy	 rather	 than	
abnormalcy,	and	their	identities	as	Muslim	and	Canadian.	In	brief,	the	conclusion	to	be	drawn	is	
that,	 on	 the	one	hand,	Muslims	have	been	 rendered	visible	with	 the	 intent	 to	distinguish	and	
differentiate	them	from	‘real’	Canadians.	Yet,	on	the	other	hand,	many	Muslims	have	also	opted	
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